声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。
期刊介绍：
《Journal of Public Economics》（公共经济学杂志）是一本专注于公共经济学领域的学术期刊。该期刊自1972年成立以来，涉及的主题包括税收政策、公共支出、社会保障、公共选择理论、环境经济学、劳动经济学、教育经济学、卫生经济学、城市经济学和发展经济学等。它探讨了公共政策的效率和分配问题，以及需求者、供应者和其他卫生保健机构的行为模型。该刊每年发行12期，平均每期发表10篇左右，2023年影响因子为4.9。
本期看点：
●美国安全网（U.S. safety net，是指美国政府为保护个人和家庭免受贫困、失业、疾病和其他社会风险的影响而建立的一系列政策和计划）：美国安全网的现金及类似现金项目平均在失业后的两年内取代了32%的收入损失，降低了18%遭受贫困的可能性。
●中国公共医疗保险：公共医疗保险的引入大幅提高了农村家庭的创业参与度。这种增长主要是由医疗保险的风险分担驱动的，而不是由于医疗费用的减少。
●残疾保险（Disability Insurance，DI）和补充保障收入（Supplemental Security Income，SSI）的福利津贴使边际受益人的死亡率增加，但是降低了超边际受益人的死亡率。
●无索赔退款保单：无索赔退款协议减少平均8%的索赔，从保单中获益更多的客户减少索赔的行为反应更强。
●社会保障改革：社会保障改革提高了年长男性的工作积极性，其中退休收入测试改革的影响最为显著。对于健康状况不佳的个体而言，他们的劳动市场反应相对较小。
※ 本期目录
●The safety net and job loss: How much insurance do public programs provide?
●We’ve got you covered! The effect of public health insurance on rural entrepreneurship in China.
●The effect of disability insurance receipt on mortality.
●No-claim refunds and healthcare use.
●Softening the blow: Job retention schemes in the pandemic.
●Why are older men working more? The role of social security.
●Payroll tax incidence: Evidence from unemployment insurance.
●Representative compensation and disability claimant outcomes.
The safety net and job loss: How much insurance do public programs provide?
安全网与失业：公共项目提供多少保险
作者
Chloe N. East（美国科罗拉多大学丹佛分校）, David Simon（美国康涅狄格大学）
摘要：We comprehensively evaluate the role of the U.S. safety net in replacing displaced workers’ lost income and health insurance using the 1996–2013 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Cash and near-cash programs replace 32% of lost income on average over the two years following job loss and reduce the likelihood of experiencing poverty by 18 percentage points. 97% of transfer benefits paid in these two years come from Unemployment Insurance. Two years after job loss, the replacement rate is 28%, but this is largely driven by UI benefit extensions unique to the Great Recession. Public health insurance makes up for 17% of the loss in private insurance, but, even two years later, rates of uninsurance are higher than pre-job loss. Looking at heterogeneous effects, in general, the safety net is progressive, though we uncover important gaps in benefits for some disadvantaged groups.
我们使用 1996-2013 年收入和计划参与调查（Survey of Income and Program Participation）全面评估了美国安全网（U.S. safety net，是指美国政府为保护个人和家庭免受贫困、失业、疾病和其他社会风险的影响而建立的一系列政策和计划。）在弥补失业工人的收入损失和健康保险方面的作用。在失业后的两年内，现金和近现金计划平均弥补了 32% 的收入损失，并将经历贫困的可能性降低了 18 个百分点。这两年支付的转移福利中有 97% 来自失业保险。失业两年后，替代率为 28%，但这主要是由大萧条特有的失业保险福利扩展推动的。公共健康保险弥补了私人保险损失的17%，但即使在两年后，未保险率也高于失业前。从异质性影响来看，一般来说，安全网是渐进的，尽管我们发现一些弱势群体在福利方面存在重大差距。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724001075
We’ve got you covered! The effect of public health insurance on rural entrepreneurship in China
我们为您提供保障！公共医疗保险对中国农村创业的影响
作者
Zhenggang Wang（香港大学），Zenan Wu（北京大学），Ye Yuan（北京大学）
摘要：Rural households contend with numerous uninsured risks that hinder their ability to leverage profitable yet risky opportunities. We study whether the provision of insurance coverage for medical expenditure, one of the most substantial and unpredictable risk, can stimulate entrepreneurship and other risky financial decisions among rural households. We leverage the progressive nationwide rollout of a universal public health insurance program in rural China. We find that the introduction of health insurance led to a substantial increase in rural households engagement in entrepreneurship. This increase is mainly driven by the risk sharing of health insurance, rather than a reduction in realized medical expenses. The entrepreneurship-promoting effect is also evident at an aggregate level, fostering the growth of smallholder businesses in rural counties. Our findings shed light on the understudied, favorable impact of health insurance on household’s risk taking in rural markets of developing countries.
农村家庭面临着许多未投保的风险，这限制了他们利用有利可图但风险较大的机会的能力。医疗支出是最重大、最难以预测的风险之一，我们研究了为医疗支出提供保险是否能刺激农村家庭的创业和其他高风险的财务决策。我们利用了在中国农村逐步推广的全民公共医疗保险项目。我们发现，医疗保险的引入大幅提高了农村家庭的创业参与度。这种增长主要是由医疗保险的风险分担驱动的，而不是由于医疗费用的减少。创业促进效应在总体水平上也很明显，促进了农村县域小农企业的发展。我们的研究结果揭示了医疗保险对发展中国家农村市场家庭风险承担的有利影响，而这一影响尚未得到充分研究。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724000860
The effect of disability insurance receipt on mortality
伤残保险领取对死亡率的影响
作者
Bernard Black(西北大学), Eric French(剑桥大学；英国财政研究所), Jeremy McCauley(布里斯托尔大学), Jae Song(美国社会保障局)
摘要：This paper estimates the effect of Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income receipt on mortality for individuals on the margin of being allowed versus denied benefits. Exploiting the random assignment of administrative law judges to disability insurance cases, we find that benefit allowance increases 10-year mortality rates by 2.8 percentage points for marginal beneficiaries. However, using a Marginal Treatment Effects approach, we find evidence that benefit receipt reduces mortality for inframarginal beneficiaries, who are typically less healthy than marginal beneficiaries. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence that allowance reduces mortality among those with expensive health conditions such as cancer.
本文估计了残疾保险（DI）和补充保障收入（SSI）的领取对处于是否获得福利边缘的个体死亡率的影响。利用随机分配行政法法官审理伤残保险案件的情况，我们发现福利津贴使边际受益人的10年死亡率增加了2.8个百分点。然而，通过使用边际处理效应方法，我们发现有证据表明，福利领取可以降低超边际受益人的死亡率，这些受益人的健康状况通常不如边际受益人。此外，我们发现有启发性的证据表明，津贴可以降低癌症等昂贵疾病患者的死亡率。
【注释】
边际受益者（marginal beneficiaries）：健康状况相对较好，经济状况也相对较好，更容易获得福利。福利的获得对他们的影响较小，因为他们的生活已经相对稳定。
超边际受益者（Inframarginal beneficiaries）：健康状况较差，经济状况也较差，福利的获得对他们来说更为重要，能够显著改善他们的生活质量和健康状况。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723002153
No-claim refunds and healthcare use
无索赔退款与医疗保健使用
作者
Daniel Avdic（迪肯大学），Simon Decker（莱茵-威斯特法伦-莱布尼茨经济研究所（RWI）），Martin Karlsson（杜伊斯堡-埃森大学），Martin Salm （蒂尔堡大学）
摘要：No-claim refunds are cost-control instruments which stipulate a payback agreement contingent on one or more claim-free years. We study how such no-claim refunds affect claiming behavior using claims data from a large German health insurer and a policy that increased the refund size for certain plans. We propose a method to decompose the effect on claims into behavioral and non-behavioral components, and show that individuals responded to the refund policy by reducing claims by eight percent on average. The effect persisted for several years; behavioral responses were stronger for clients with more to gain from the policy; and reductions in claims were not restricted to treatments of questionable medical value.
无索赔退款是一种成本控制工具，它规定了在一到多个无索赔年份的情况下的退款协议。我们利用一家大型德国医疗保险公司的索赔数据以及一种提高了某些计划退款金额的保单，研究了这种无索赔退款如何影响索赔行为。我们提出了一种方法，将索赔的影响分解为行为和非行为成分，并表明个体通过减少平均8%的索赔来响应退款政策。这一效应持续了数年；从保单中获益更多的客户的行为反应更强；索赔的减少并不局限于医学价值不大的治疗。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723002438
Softening the blow: Job retention schemes in the pandemic
缓解冲击：疫情中的就业保留计划
作者
Jolan Mohimont（比利时国家银行）, Maite de Sola Perea（比利时安特卫普大学）, Marie-Denise Zachary（比利时国家银行）
摘要：We evaluate the welfare effects of the temporary job retention schemes (JRS) implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in a DSGE model with incomplete insurance and heterogeneous agents calibrated to the euro area. JRS have large favorable welfare effects and benefit all households when they are well targeted at potentially viable jobs at risk of being lost. These gains are particularly strong for liquid-asset-poor households, especially for those that are also unemployed or on furlough. The job protection component of JRS explains almost all the welfare gains they deliver, while their high level of generosity plays a minor role and has ambiguous net aggregate welfare effects. We also discuss the conditions that make JRS valuable and show that they can cause a decrease in welfare when they subsidize too many safe jobs; when they are targeted at non-viable jobs that will inevitably be lost once schemes end; and when implemented in economies where labor market frictions are low.
我们评估了在应对COVID-19大流行时实施的临时工作保留计划（job retention schemes，JRS）的福利效应。这些计划在一个与欧元区校准的、具有不完全保险和异质性代理人的动态随机一般均衡（DSGE）模型中进行评估。当JRS能够很好地针对可能可持续但有失业风险的工作时，它们对所有家庭都有巨大的正面福利效应。对于流动性资产较少的家庭，尤其是那些失业或被强制休假的家庭，这些收益尤其显著。JRS的就业保护部分几乎解释了它们带来的所有福利收益，而它们的高慷慨程度只起到了次要作用，并且对总体净福利效应具有模糊影响。我们还讨论了使JRS有价值的条件，并展示了JRS在以下情形可能会导致福利下降：当JRS补贴过多的安全工作时；当它们针对一旦计划结束就不可避免会失去的不可持续的工作时；以及在劳动力市场摩擦较低的经济体中实施时。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724001348
Why are older men working more? The role of social security
为何年长男性更倾向于继续工作？社会保障的影响
作者
Zhixiu Yu（路易斯安那州立大学）
摘要：This paper investigates the role of Social Security reforms in explaining the increase in labor supply of older men across cohorts and evaluates the labor response by health status. I develop and estimate a rich dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply, savings, and Social Security application that captures the key structure of Social Security retirement benefits, disability insurance, and pension systems, while accounting for uncertainties in health, survival, wages, and medical expenditures. The model matches well the observed life-cycle profiles of employment, hours per worker, and savings for men in the 1930s cohort from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. I find that Social Security reforms account for over 77% of the observed rises in employment and hours worked by the 1950s cohort, with the retirement earnings test reforms being the most important. The labor response is smaller for unhealthy individuals due to the work disincentives provided by disability benefits.
本文探讨了社会保障改革对不同年龄段老年男性劳动供给增加的影响，并根据不同健康状况评估了劳动市场的反应。本文建立并估算了一个详尽的动态生命周期模型，该模型涵盖了劳动供给、储蓄和社会保障申请，并且捕捉了社会保障退休福利、残疾保险和养老金体系的主要结构，同时考虑了健康、生存、工资和医疗支出的不确定性因素。该模型与来自动态小组研究的1930年代出生群体男性的就业、每人工作小时数和储蓄的观察数据相吻合。研究结果表明，社会保障改革对1950年代出生群体就业和工作小时数的增加贡献超过77%，其中退休收入测试改革的影响最为显著。对于健康状况不佳的个体而言，由于残疾福利降低了工作积极性，他们的劳动市场反应相对较小。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724000070
Payroll tax incidence: Evidence from unemployment insurance
工资税的归宿：来自失业保险的证据
作者
Audrey Guo（美国圣塔克拉拉大学）
摘要：Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed through to worker wages. Using state policy changes and administrative data of matched employer–employee job spells, I study how employment and earnings respond to unexpected payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of pass-through to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young workers and single-establishment firms.
经济模型假设工资税负担完全落在工人身上，但是当税收具有企业特定性和时变性时，税收归宿会落在何处？美国的失业保险具有在不同雇主之间以及随时间变化的关键特征，如果税收成本不能完全转嫁给工人工资，这可能会引发劳动力需求的反应。利用州政策变化和匹配雇主-雇员工作记录的行政数据，本文研究了高风险暴露雇主的雇佣和收入是如何对意外的工资税增长做出反应的。本文发现就业增长显著下降，这是招聘减少造成的，而对收入的转嫁效应不显著。对于年轻工人和单一机构公司，负面的就业效应最为强烈。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724001452
Representative compensation and disability claimant outcomes
法律代表报酬与残疾申请结果
作者
Cody Tuttle（德克萨斯大学）, Riley Wilson（杨百翰大学）
摘要：Many claimants of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) retain legal representation to help with the approval process. The Social Security Administration imposes strict rules on representative compensation. Representatives are only paid if claimants are awarded disability, and they are paid the lesser of 25 percent of the claimant’s past due benefits or a pre-specified maximum fee ($7,200 since 2022). Because past due benefits are a function of the number of months claimants wait to be awarded, representatives face incentives to delay case resolution until past due benefits push the representative fees past the fee ceiling. We use difference-in-differences to evaluate how these incentives impact SSDI claimant wait times. After the fee ceiling increased in 2002, average wait times increased by 0.85 months among claimants for whom the fee threshold is more binding, implying a 2.6–5.6 month increase for claimants with representatives. This indicates that the structure of representative compensation does matter for case outcomes, and highlights the importance of interactions with auxiliary agents so common in modern social programs.
许多社会保障残疾保险（SSDI）的申请人会聘请法律代表来协助审批流程。社会保障管理局对代表报酬有着严格规定，只有当申请人获批残疾认定时代表才能获得报酬，且报酬取申请人逾期福利的 25% 或预先设定的最高费用（自 2022 年起为 7200 美元）两者中的较低者。由于逾期福利是申请者等待批准的月份数的函数，代表们有动机推迟案件解决，直至逾期福利使代表费用超过费用上限。文章采用双重差分法来评估这些激励因素对 SSDI 申请人等待时间的影响。在2002年费用上限提高之后，对于那些费用门槛更具约束力的申请者，平均等待时间增加了0.85个月，这意味着有代表的申请者的等待时间增加了2.6至5.6个月。这表明代表补偿的结构确实对案件结果有影响，并强调了与辅助代理的互动在现代社会项目中的重要性。
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272724000689
